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E
stablished under the Social Security Act of 1935,
unemployment insurance (UI) is one of the largest
government labor programs in the United States. In
most states, UI programs replace 50 percent of a claimant’s
preunemployment wage up to a maximum benefit level for
up to six months. In a new paper, economist Raj Chetty
of the University of California at Berkeley presents an eval-
uation of the efficiency of the UI system. 
Chetty begins his paper by noting, “One of the classic
empirical results in public finance is that social insurance
programs such as unemployment insurance reduce labor
supply.” Various studies have
found that a 10 percent increase in
UI benefits is associated with
increases in the average duration
of unemployment of between 4
percent and 8 percent. The long-
established explanation for this
finding is that UI benefits create
an incentive for workers to remain
unemployed. This incentive stems
from the fact that receipt of UI benefits is conditional on a
worker remaining unemployed. In the language of econom-
ics, UI benefits are said to induce “moral hazard” among
workers. Such behavior is welfare-reducing — making it
undesirable from a policy perspective. 
However, Chetty argues that the standard view of the UI
program overstates the effect of moral hazard. He argues
that UI does not increase unemployment durations solely
due to moral hazard. Rather, there is a second channel
through which UI causes longer unemployment durations:
the “liquidity effect.” The liquidity effect is directly tied to
the observation that many workers have limited liquid net
worth at the time of job loss. These workers are unable to
“smooth consumption” over the course of their unemploy-
ment. Instead, they have to make cuts in their expenditures,
some of which might prove quite difficult. As a result, liq-
uidity constrained workers face greater pressure to quickly
find employment than unconstrained workers. 
Receipt of UI benefits, however, improves constrained
workers’ liquidity, allowing them to more easily smooth con-
sumption. Consequently, they may spend more time looking
for jobs that match their particular skills. In contrast to the
moral hazard effect, the liquidity effect is socially beneficial.  
If private credit and insurance markets were free of dis-
tortions, then liquidity constrained workers could tap them
for liquidity. However, when private market imperfections
exist, the UI program can fill the gap by providing 
liquidity to constrained workers. In such a case, UI-induced
increases in unemployment durations are due to both the
liquidity and moral hazard effects. Determining the ratio of
the two effects in raising unemployment durations under UI
determines the extent to which UI is optimal. 
“To the extent that it is the liquidity effect, UI reduces
the need for agents to rush back to work because they have
insufficient ability to smooth consumption; if it is primarily
the moral hazard effect, UI is subsidizing unproductive
leisure,” Chetty writes. 
Chetty takes advantage of changes in benefit levels across
U.S. states to compare the effect of changes in benefit levels
on the unemployment durations
of constrained and unconstrained
households. He finds that a 10
percent increase in UI benefits is
associated with a 7 percent to 10
percent increase in unemploy-
ment durations within the
constrained group. On the other
hand, the unconstrained group is
far less affected by increases in
benefit levels. The fact that there is a differential between
the constrained and unconstrained groups indicates that the
liquidity effect is in play. 
However, Chetty notes that while this result is indicative
of the existence of a liquidity effect, it doesn’t reveal its mag-
nitude. To determine the magnitude of the liquidity effect,
Chetty turns to another type of unemployment compensa-
tion: lump-sum severance payments. The effect of
lump-sum payments on unemployment durations is entirely
due to the liquidity effect. This is because receipt of the 
payment is not conditional on the worker remaining unem-
ployed. Therefore, lump-sum payments do not induce moral
hazard. He finds that workers who received lump-sum pay-
ments had longer unemployment durations than those who
didn’t receive the payments. Because moral hazard is 
unlikely to be driving this difference, Chetty concludes that
the liquidity effect is the cause.
He writes, “Using data from the United States, I estimate
that the liquidity effect accounts for 60 percent of the 
marginal effect of UI benefits on durations at current 
benefit rates. This estimate implies that a benefit equal to 
50 percent of the preunemployment wage is near optimal in
a UI system that pays constant benefits for six months.” 
Chetty’s findings are at odds with much of the previous
literature on unemployment insurance. His provocative
paper will likely stimulate further research on this important
topic, research that will be of interest to academics and 
policymakers alike. RF
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